The Coming Crisis
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It is with hesitation that I press on with a comment on contemporary
international relations. The
incessant crises in the Middle East and the surrounding regions should daunt
anyone. The Russia-Ukraine conflict
and then the Israel-Gaza events are not just appalling; they go beyond the
expected coverage of diplomatic niceties, of analysis and explanation, and
raise questions beyond answer within the normal range of discourse. Further events in Sudan are resulting in
yet more suffering. I am not
sufficiently expert to comment in depth on current events in the Middle
East and the surrounding regions, so the remarks about the present wars or
the preceding events must be interpreted in that context.
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Yet there are not infrequent events on the global stage that are
seldom discussed as they ought to be.
Likewise there are soldiers who come back from wars and never refer
in the rest of their lives to that experience. So I press on. The approach of the western powers to
Ukraine and to Israel is unfortunate, if only because the underlyings are
not disclosed or discussed. There
has been a need to challenge the excesses of western elites for decades
now, but it must be on a selective rather than broad brush basis.
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Recent developments in this region raise questions about the quality
of western civilisation both in terms of history and in terms of
ethics. The Middle East is broadly
acknowledged as the cradle of civilisation and so it has implications for
us in the West. Yet we also need to
move on. Not only is there a
dimension resulting from class in these conflicts; there is also an ethical
dimension and we need to make progress.
Yet conflict in the wider Middle East will not be easily
resolved. The German/Polish
theologian Paul Tillich wrote a book entitled The Shaking of the Foundations in 1948 whose title is prophetic
rather than reflexive.
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For my view is that that phrase is better applied to the current
situation than to the days when he wrote.
World War II laid down an absolute wrong in the Holocaust; and an
absolute authority, that of the Allies, which was passed on to the UN
Security Council. That legacy has
been challenged and questioned ever since but now a deeper layer of
foundations is exposed in current events.
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Later (1960) came Daniel Bell’s The
End of Ideology. Just look
beyond the title for a moment. He
equates ‘ideology’ with ‘socialism’ or ‘Marxism’ and sees no ideology in the
expositions, reports, polemics and indeed diatribes of capitalism whether
in Economics itself, or in the newspapers and TV shows of the right.
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Thirdly, Alvin Gouldner in 1970 wrote a book under the title The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology. But the crisis he anticipated seemed more
designed to reinforce established civilisation than to criticise it. As he sees it, the earlier affinity of
socialism with sociology, of the 1930s and 1940s, enabled Jewish refugees
from Nazism, amongst others, to be recognised and valued as social
commentators and critics; but this positive development has been whittled
down as the supposed objectivity of university work was demolished by the
interests of financial backers.
Today the lure of university status seems to annihilate altogether
critical social thought. Thus Gouldner’s study is a major attempt to delineate the
dangers of social science research being ensnared by the enticements of
office. It is significant that both Bell and
Gouldner
make vital contributions to discussions concerning future social and
political structures however flawed their arguments. They expose the challenges that were at
that date still to be faced. They
both indeed foresaw a crisis ahead.
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Classical Diplomacy Limited
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The first matter of interest is that models have changed. 19th century diplomacy focussed on half a
dozen states within Europe in a balance of power with a blurred edge. A code of conduct had been established
and followed that had originated in classical Greece and developed
subsequently through Rome, Constantinople and then medieval Italy and
France. It found its final form
following the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 when the practices and standards
familiar today were agreed in Europe: the Entente Cordiale came a bit later
but, throughout, the Balance of Power was essential. From the earliest days, that you do not
kill a messenger even though he be from an enemy, was the first principle
of diplomacy and it survives still in the acceptance of diplomatic
immunity. Yet in the extent of
killing in current crises, one can scarcely say this principle of restraint
is in good health. Further one should
note that the activities of imperialists in their empires did not fall within
the scope of diplomatic protocols.
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The above sketch of diplomatic history follows Harold Nicolson’s
discussion as set out in his four Chichele lectures of 1953. I am particularly interested in his
reference to De Callière’s study of diplomacy. He cites the contrast that De Callière
makes between trickery on the one hand and taking pains to establish good
relations and trust in diplomacy on the other. Other discussions of the balance of power
relate to 19th century Europe as for instance Henry Kissinger’s study of
diplomacy. But they tend to ignore
the fact that, in the aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia, Prussia took on
a territorial identity and Poland was partitioned.
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Even today after the Cold War, both Kissinger and conventional
historians have approached International Relations in these terms and from
this perspective, that is, in terms derived from European history and the
balance of power. The fact that the
two world wars were global in scale scarcely affected this, though Woodrow
Wilson’s 14 points initiated the opening of a new dimension in
International Relations, namely that of an international authority in the
form of a League of Nations subsequently to be recreated as the United
Nations. Then the Cold War came
quickly to dominate these relations and that introduced a different
framework. The bilateral world had
arrived and now it has waned. The
world is now multi-lateral.
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But we are finding problems.
The conflicts in the Middle East go beyond the explicit codes of
European diplomacy. Yet these
circumstances I believe are not intended to challenge the civilisation that
preceded them but to reinforce and consolidate that past, however its
structure may be modified. In my
view that prior civilisation is obsolete, failing, and needs to be
challenged. It was based on personal
rule when personal rule already formed an inadequate structure. Moreover, the structures used could not
and cannot handle the complexities of a global world. For the basic structures rested on faulty
science – racism to create artificial division. The structure founded on ethnography is
better able to support government than the structure founded on race. The reason for this is clear: ethnography
takes into account all differences between humans, especially cultural and
linguistic, and not just physical differences.
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The objects – structures – in the political sphere can be variously
described. The paradigm is the
nation-state of Western Europe. The
USA takes that model, even though the scale of the state is enlarged and
the USA constitution has not responded well to that scale. The recently independent nations follow
the same model, perhaps also not happily.
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There are also many tiny states, principalities sometimes called,
whose identity as a nation state is problematic, if only on the grounds of
scale. Their status demands
support. Russia is full of
contradictions – first an empire, then as a socialist union and then in a
break up into separate states. China
might still be an empire if it were not a communist state.
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International law is commonly referred to as authoritative. But it is not, for a ‘rules-based’ order
is so weak as to be defied even by those who speak for it. Sovereignty lies in the independent
countries of the world, in the states in membership of the UN, in the
world’s nation-states.
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The modern world is certainly multi-player but how many are
present? Bodies such as the G7 and
G20 proliferate. BRICS (Brazil,
India, Russia, China and South Africa) started about 15 years ago as an
investor’s label identifying states with comparable economic
characteristics. But recently there has been expressed an interest in
turning it into a body comparable to the G20; it holds annual meetings and
its membership currently includes additionally Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and
UAE. COP 26 is emerging on a similar
programme aimed at climate management.
But Davos (officially the World Economic Forum) is an invitation or
high-fee body open to CEOs and politicians of comparable status. It is impossible to find a coherent
pattern but there are many hints of separate patterns. In addition to making some examination of
the many states that do not fit into the classic western definition of
nation-state, we need a policy with regard to the enormous number of
international bodies created for particular purposes. They are important not least because they
are voluntaristic. But they need
explicit understanding and interpretation.
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There are a number of major dimensions of International Relations – e.g.
military, economic and commercial, cultural and of course migration is
currently to the fore. But basically
a state seeks friends and seeks support.
And so deals with friends as for instance in supply chains. Economic boycotts are relatively new, and
in frequent, not occasional, practice.
They require organisation on an international scale which is
trouble.
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In the past, international relations have been very particular: Each relationship is ‘special’, as for
instance USA with UK; or with South America under the name ‘Monroe
Doctrine’. But others are evident as
for instance China with Russia or, on a different vector, with the UK. Much is based on personal relationships
which may cross over from the political and military spheres to the commercial
very flexibly.
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Creating models might be a very useful exercise. Games theorists might blink before trying
to model a 200-player game; yet multi-player games are emerging on the
web. This is not a trivial
matter. The early models of a
dominant centralised authority or of major powers seeking imperialist
expansion are of the past. The
differentiation, definition and separation of powers is an essential means
of advancing, through institutional structure, current notions of
international law or of ‘rules-based’ order.
The Cold War brought
International Relations down to two players. But that was not quite all. The UN continued even though in some
quarters it has been denigrated ferociously. Further, some states sought to create a
non-aligned status which continues to play a role. In effect the UN’s approximately 200
members define the sovereign players or entities of the modern world while,
beyond and above that, the five members of the Security Council hold an
exceptional status which is defined by their role in World War II. Yet for a small administrative body the
UN does a large amount of aid work in humanitarian crises and in conflict
resolution. Nonetheless the authority
of the UN only extends to these very limited functions; it does not extend
to the large body of international law which, broadly speaking, only
commands partial consent.
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We can certainly see that matters have changed today with the end of
the Cold War and Soviet Union. The
world of international bodies; and there are many, hundreds, of them
demands recognition even though, with the exception of the UN, none hold
sovereignty. International law is
often cited and there are two international courts that pronounce verdicts. But it is not today authoritative. Only in the UN is there a skeletal but
important sovereignty relating to the powers of the members of the Security
Council and also to the member states in their Assembly deliberations.
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Case Studies
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Let me turn a little to look at some further particular
matters. Israel was created in the
Partition Plan of the UN in 1947.
But Zionism had already emerged when anti-Semitism spread in late
19th century Europe. With the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I, Jewish
settlement increased by 100,000 fleeing persecution. Thereafter it was the Holocaust that
brought the issue to the fore.
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There have been other major causes of loss of life. From the St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of
the Huguenots in medieval France, the Armenian massacres of the late 19th/early
20th century; World War I itself; and the ensuing flu epidemic, they are
widely found but not discussed. Then
on the eastern front in World War II, there were 25 million Soviet dead. Germans died scarcely proportionately and
certainly not in excess. British and
US soldiers in World War II scarcely died at all. But the partition of the British-ruled
territory India caused deaths exceeding a million. In other recent situations of conflict,
death numbers are not given, whether in Iraq or from famine in Africa or
elsewhere.
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I have suggested before that violence in western civilisation runs
to excess. But this consideration
must be taken further. It is not
merely the excess of physical force.
There is also the excess of rule-breaking and a lack of regard for
ethics. Treaties are signed and then
treated as worthless. Norms exist in
trade and cultural relations and then are disregarded or overthrown when
convenient. It is, beyond physical
violence, the level of deception, fraud and double-dealing that needs to be
questioned. De Callière said so
centuries ago; it all the more must be said again today. A rule-based order is less than
international law and a court with no means of enforcement has little
authority. Yet, to speak for
‘rules-based order’ is well and good; but you should not then disregard the
rules when they challenge your power.
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With regard to Europe, the idea of a regional bloc such as the EU is
to my mind both outdated and inappropriate.
But that of voluntary associations or spheres of influence based on
friendship and kinship patterns, or other shared interests, may retain
great significance. These
collectivities may have a geographical basis but it is not necessary and
may not be desirable. In addition
voluntary associations between states on the basis of common instrumental
interests are important. Today the
focus is on common ecological pressures but other shared interests may
arise. Ethnicities that include
harmful practices may be subject to legitimate ethical concerns and
challenge. The failure of Boris
Johnson to build on Brexit is disturbing.
What did he think he was doing seeking to regress to 19th century
autocracy? Modern trends towards
fascism are shocking for always the drive to the right results in excess
violence.
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From this perspective Europe remains a valuable partner. But it is not a unified state and cannot
constitute that. Western Europe,
Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean and Scandinavia are each distinct areas
with separate further connections and qualities. The Brussels regime possibly modelled on
Washington DC is a false trail and ill-adjusted to the unique
characteristics of the separate states.
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Ethnicity whether interpreted at the level of national identity or
in the micro level of kinship, family and clan is one great dimension of
social structure. The other of
course is class. Without these two
major dimensions, social structure could not exist - it would degrade into
some incoherent mess. Kinship
perhaps emerged very early on as the basis on which a proto-state to
safeguard a person’s legacy might be created; for the family, property and
inheritance underlie everything social and political. But today the modern corporation has a
structure that takes one far beyond this early origin and the ‘family firm’
has only a mythical place among the major institutions of society. Yet the modern corporation is in
desperate need of reconstruction while the family must be re-interpreted
following patterns of extended kinship.
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One must support ethnicity
but equally one must put a stop to cruel and harmful practices sanctioned
by tradition and required as part of ethnic identity. Natural differences between ethnic groups
should be recognised. Positive
discrimination has a real but limited value. While ethnicity is scarcely a basis for a
state, an ethnic group generally shares a language and territory and is an
important social construct.
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Amongst other factors, these considerations have implications for
our concerns. Migration as an issue is
today to the fore. Migration
threatens and challenges the nation-state by creating mixed
identities. Today migration exists
on an enormous scale and in this feature is relatively new. It forms a new dimension of international
relations. But though the search for
work is encouraged by capitalism and freedom from tyranny fundamental, it
challenges national and ethnic identities and this is unacceptable. Yet here in migration we are beginning to
see the raw materials upon which social classes, the other great dimension
of the social system, with their search for justice, are founded. For migrants depend on the integrity of
their work to survive and past recruitment values like kinship or political
patronage must be discarded.
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Another element of structure namely sovereign assets or sovereign
debt is problematic – especially when held by emerging states. A state with debt exceeding its income
(GDP or foreign earnings) is in trouble, unless it is the reserve currency. But if this debt is wholly or in part the
result of market forces, or is politically motivated, the sovereign state
is not wholly to blame.
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The practice whereby a powerful state can subject a small state to
exploitation by using markets to keep aggregate payments for crops and
minerals low in proportion to the price levels of the large power’s
exports, is unacceptable. This is
not the competition enabled by markets; it is exploitation by the means of
manipulative trading practices.
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Implications
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The implication is that sovereignty should contain substantial
authority. Protection of sovereignty
is essential and some state assets should be unassailable. That status is in effect defined today by
UN membership. The task now is to
specify its elements more fully, for small states are excessively
vulnerable. There is much talk in
some quarters of failed states and similar problems. But, while this may just be a lead into
re-colonisation, for military and financial pressure can push any state
into this category, there is a responsibility on the leaders of states to
ensure the structures of their state function well. Conflict between states is not inherently
undesirable. The challenge to the
British state in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s was not out of
order. The Algerian war of independence
was costly in lives on both sides; that too was an appalling conflict but
it had its purpose. On the present
troubles in the Middle East and the adjacent areas, I must refrain from
further comment. The issues at stake
are deeper than is presented in current reporting and that poses a limit.
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In the broadest terms, it is equally essential to build up common
ties and interests between sovereign states. To forward this aim, we have to look for
new models of international relations beyond those familiar from the
past. The calculus that historically
focussed on armed conflict needs expanding and the emergence of economic
warfare, as seen in trade and financial boycotts, demands attention. Further, telecommunications and the
digital world pose a different challenge to old international orders. Within this arena of knowledge and
capability, the extensive and under-acknowledged underground worlds
challenge us all: beyond organised crime and the drug trade, the dark side
of the internet, and crypto currency in particular, tend to make nonsense
of old orders. Covert operations,
however thoroughly concealed, lie within the meaning of aggression. One must conclude that constitutional and
formal authority demand re-thinking.
Excess of violence pervades all these categories of action and that
must be questioned. You cannot right
a wrong by an even larger wrong.
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The conflicts today in the Middle East force into our minds the
severity of all these challenges. In
particular the calculus of violence requires reconstruction as a calculus
of conflict. Foreign intervention in
elections may be an aggressive act as is increasingly recognised for
instance by Georgia and the EU’s president.
The use of market forces to bankrupt a state likewise ls an
aggressive act. These facts need to
be recognised. Further, it should be
acknowledged that too much violence by western powers is on a ‘first
strike’ basis, as enunciated in the NATO Charter. This pre-emptive use of force cannot be
justified. It is an assertion of power
and superiority that contradicts the moral beliefs professed by these
elites.
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Some say conflict must always come to a resolution; but if that is
achieved by superior power, it is likely to result in suppressed opposition
that may endure for centuries. This
should not be allowed to happen in the Middle East.
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PJC
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July 2024.
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CORRECTION TO NEWSLETTER NO.2:
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I can find no trace of phrase ‘greed is
good’ in Adam Smith. The phrase came
into circulation only recently.
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